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DESEGREGATION IN EDUCATION
DESEGREGATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION -
A GENERATION OF FUTURE LITIGATION
By WALTER F. MURPHY*
That the Southern reaction to the Supreme Court's
decisions in the recent Segregation Cases' would be one of
disapproval was certainly expected. The Gallup Poll figures
showing that 71 per cent2 of the people in the South were
opposed to the ruling was surprising only in that the per-
centage was not larger. The commonplace prediction is
* Charles E. Merriam Fellow, Department of Political Science, University
of Chicago; A.B., University of Notre Dame; M.A., George Washington
University; Instructor, Dept. of Govt., United States Naval Academy
1952-1955.
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), declaring racial
segregation in state public schools to be unconstitutional, and Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954), companion opinion declaring racial segrega-
tion in the public schools of the District of Columbia unconstitutional, and
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955), leaving it to the lower
courts to frame decrees implementing the Supreme Court's decisions.
It is not the purpose of this article to analyze these cases as such, or the
law which preceded them; but rather, accepting them as fait accompli, it
proposes to consider the reaction in those states with segregated school
systems, which suggests the possibility for years of litigation before the
decisions may be fully implemented. For the course of the cases in the
Supreme Court, see Prof. G. Kenneth Relblich's summaries of the 1952,
1953, and 1954 terms of the Supreme Court respectively in 73 S. Ct. 87, 74
S. Ct. 109, and 75 S. Ct. 113. For more exhaustive legal treatment see:
Leflar and Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools - 1953, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 377 (1954); Maslow and Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the
Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. of Ch. L. Rev. 363 (1953) ; and other
articles, casenotes, and comments referred to in Reiblich, supra.
Quite obviously there will be a plethora of litigation in the other "sepa-
rate but equal" areas as both sides scramble for either legal clarification
or obfuscation of the doctrine of the School Segregation cases. Since the
scope of this aspect of the problem Is far too broad for consideration here,
this discussion will be limited to the field of public education. See Holmes
v. City of Atlanta, 100 L. ed. (Adv. Sh.) 76, 350 U. S. ... (#396, 1955) and
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 100 L. Ed. (Adv. Sh.) 75,
350 U. S. ... (#232, 1955) ; also material in Reiblich, supra, and Roche,
Plessy v. Ferguson: Requiescaf In Pace? 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 44 (1954).
2Washington Post and Times Herald, July 11, 1954. Gallup found that
education had a great effect on opinion. Whereas in the South only 19
per cent of high school graduates approved the Supreme Court ruling, 38
per cent of college graduates approved. This is opposed to the nation wide
average of 73 per cent approval by college graduates and 54 per cent
approval by high school graduates. Age was another important factor;
while only 23 per cent of Southerners over 50 approved, 31 per cent of the
21-29 age bracket approved. Location was a third influence: 30 per cent of
Southerners in cities over 10,000 in population were in favor of the ruling,
while only 18 per cent of those living in rural areas were not displeased.
(Ibid, July 14, 1954.) There was a significant shift in the North on the
practical question of "Would you object to having your children attend a
school where the majority of pupils are Negroes?'' Nation wide results
shows that 54 per cent of people would object; 45 per cent of Northern
whites would object. (Ibid, July 16, 1954.)
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that there will be a generation of litigation before the South
will cooperate freely in racial intermingling in the public
schools. This article is an effort to outline the indicated
trends which Southern states have been following in their
reactions to the Segregation ruling, and to analyze, on the
basis of existing law, the legal fate of the impending litiga-
tion. The first and apparently most popular plan to evade
the Supreme Court's edict, the turning over of public
schools to private concerns, will be examined at length.
The other schemes, less widespread and less far-reaching in
their implications, will be treated individually in shorter
sub-sections.
I.
South Carolina, under the leadership of ex-Associate
Justice James F. Byrnes, was the first state to put into
execution a private system plan. In November of 1952,
eighteen months before the Supreme Court acted, South
Carolina voters approved a state constitutional amend-
ment which would allow the legislature to abolish public
education.' Georgia and Mississippi followed suit in No-
vember and December of 1954.4 The line of thought of
these three states is apparently that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment covers only action by the state or by officials acting
under color of state law, and therefore, if there is no public
school system, if there are no teachers and school officials
working for the state, then there can be no injunction
against the operation of segregated schools or orders to
admit colored students. Federal courts will thus be without
jurisdiction even to hear cases involving these private
institutions.
This same line of reasoning was employed by Texas and
South Carolina in the 1940's when they tried to maintain
a white primary election. After its defeat in the earlier
Nixon cases,5 Texas had allowed the Democratic Party of
the state to set its own standards of membership. The
New York Times, November 6, 1952, 31:7.
'Georgia: ibid, November 18, 1954, 31:1; Mississippi, ibid, December 22,
1954, 15:1.
5Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S.
73 (1932).
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Party restricted itself to white people. This was subse-
quently upheld in 1935 in Grovey v. Townsend.8 In 1944,
with only Justice Roberts, the author of the Grovey opinion,
dissenting, the Supreme Court reversed itself in Smith v.
A1lwright
Justice Reed for the majority of the Court pointed out
that Texas required voters in the primary election to pay
a poll tax; it required the election of county officers of the
party; primaries were conducted under statutory authority;
no name not certified as having been so chosen could
appear on the general election ballot unless nominated by
qualified voters who had to swear that they had not par-
ticipated in any party primary; and, finally, that Texas
courts were given authority to issue writs of mandamus to
compel the observance of these duties. He found that this
elaborate statutory system made the party in fact an agency
of the state, and as such subject to the prohibitions of the
Fifteenth Amendment."
Point number one may then be made. If these three
states do carry out their authorized plan to abolish public
schools, they will have to do so completely. They may
exercise no control over the standards or methods of educa-
tion. Nor can they require that their citizens attend school
or have a certain degree of education. To impose duties
on the private corporations which would take over the
operation of the state schools would make these corpora-
tions agencies of the state under the dictum of Smith v.
A1lwright.
But Justice Reed did not stop with the declaration of
the agency relationship. He went on to attack the argu-
ment of the Texan lawyers that since the right to maintain
a political party was guaranteed by the First Amendment,
every reasonable exercise of that privilege, including the
determination of membership, was likewise guaranteed,
stating in part:
"This grant to the people of the opportunity for
choice is not to be nullified by a state through casting
0 295 U. S. 45 (1935).
7321 U. S. 649 (1944).
Ibid, 663.
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its electoral process in a form which permits a private
organization to practice racial discrimination in the
election. Constitutional rights would be of little value
if they could be thus indirectly denied."I
On its face this would seem to have halted any future
attempts to maintain a white primary; but for motivations
which sound curiously like those now offered for refusal to
desegregate, some Southern states hung on to their peculiar
institution. The State of South Carolina came up with
the most ingenious solution for avoiding the Supreme
Court's decision. Governor Olin D. Johnston called a special
session of the state legislature nine days after Smith v.
A1lwright and called for the repeal of all references to
primary elections either in the state code or constitution,
stating in part:
"I regret that this ruling by the United States
Supreme Court has forced this issue upon us but we
must meet it like men .... History has taught us we
must keep our white-primaries pure and unadulterated
so that we might protect the welfare and honor of all
the people of our state .... White Supremacy will be
maintained in our primaries. Let the chips fall where
they may."'"
The legislature acted quickly and efficiently. Within
four days the lawmakers had passed one hundred and fifty
acts repealing all statutes which contained any reference,
direct or indirect, to primaries. An amendment repealing
the sole clause in the state constitution mentioning pri-
maries was proposed and subsequently ratified by the
people of the state.
The state Democratic Party Convention which met in
1946 was a "private organization" laying down qualifica-
tions for participation in club activities. The basic require-
ment that a member of the party must be a "white
democrat" was unchanged from previous years. The only
significant shift was the lowering of the age minimum
9Ibid, 664.
L Quoted In Brief for Appellee, U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, Clay Rice et al. v. George Elmore, No. 5664, 1947, p. 27.
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to 18. Since state law neither required nor regulated a
primary election, the party, again like a private club, under-
took to conduct such elections as it had in the past. Now
fraud was punishable only by party and not by legal sanc-
tions. Election officials were party, not state, officers."
In the summer of 1947, this new arrangement was at-
tacked by the NAACP in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of South Carolina in Elmore v. Rice. The
case was heard before Judge J. Waties Waring, who in the
earlier case of Thompson v. Gibbes," had ruled that un-
equal pay for negro teachers was discrimination in terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment. His opinion in Elmore v.
Rice was to the point. He reasoned that the repeal of the
statutes was meaningless, that the Democratic Party oper-
ated the same as it had prior to 1944, and to say that this
did not continue to be state action was to avoid the facts.
Neither the Governor nor the legislature had attempted to
conceal the fact that the purpose behind the repeal had
been to circumvent the Allwright decision, so there was
little reason to give credence to lawyers' arguments that
this was not true. While the General Assembly repealed
the primary regulations, the people of the state had as-
sembled in convention and had enacted practically the
same rules.
Judge Waring admitted that private clubs could choose
their own membership, but private clubs did not elect a
president of the United States. Under the law all citizens
were privileged to participate in elections; the only real
election in the state was that conducted by the Democratic
Party in its primary. The Judge's words dripped judicial
sarcasm: "It is time for South Carolina to rejoin the union.
It is time to fall in step with the other states and to adopt
the American way of conducting elections."' 4
n Rules of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, Adopted by the
Democratic State Convention, Holden at Columbia, May 17, 1944, p. 2.
72 F. Supp. 516 (D. C. E. D. S. C., 1947).
'60 F. Supp. 872 (D. C. E. D. S. C., 1945). This case concerned the ques-
tion of pay for Negro teachers equal to that for white people for the same
work requiring the same qualifications. No court order was issued because
prior to the decision the state announced it would equalize the salaries.
u Supra, n. 12, 528.
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The request for a declaratory judgment was granted.
The opinion closed with the statement that the defendants
and their successors in office would be enjoined from ex-
cluding qualified voters from enrollment in the party and
from voting in elections because of race. The injunction
itself, however, only ordered that the party poll managers
be restrained from denying Negroes the right to vote; it
did not mention enrollment in the party. 5
The Democratic Party appealed the ruling and in No-
vember and December of 1947 arguments were heard be-
fore the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit sitting in Richmond, Virginia. Thurgood Marshall
closed his brief for the appellee with an eloquent plea which
played on the harp of Justice Reed's Allwright opinion:
"Basic civil rights grounded in the Constitution can-
not be revoked by technicalities. In South Carolina the
Democratic Party has for years controlled the voters,
the legislature, the State, and its elected representa-
tives in Congress. It is impossible to discern the line
between the Democratic Party and the State of South
Carolina. The repeal of the primary statutes was a de-
liberate attempt to evade the decision of the United
States Supreme Court .... This deliberate effort to
circumvent the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court is another challenge to our ability as a nation to
protect the rights of all our citizens in practice rather
than in theory."' 6
On the day before New Year's Eve of 1947, Chief Judge
John J. Parker delivered the three-judge court's decision.
He acknowledged the claim of Thurgood Marshall that the
Democratic Party and its primary were the controlling fac-
tors in South Carolina elections and that this primary had
become an integral part of the election machinery. The
question which then arose was whether a state could avoid
provisions of the federal Constitution by allowing a political
party to take over a part of its electoral process and by so
Record in Elmore v. Rice, U. S. District Court for the Eastern District
of South Carolina, Civil Action #1702, 1947.
"Brief for Appellee, 8upra, n. 10, pp. 24-25.
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doing deny a racial group a voice in government. The
answer had to be in the negative.1"
Chief Judge Parker held that those who controlled the
Democratic Party and the state government could not
absolve themselves of their duties under the Constitution
by placing the first step in the electoral process in the hands
of the party. When party officials participated in what was
a part of the state's election apparatus they became officers
of the state de facto if not de jure, and as such were subject
to the restraints imposed by the Constitution."8
The Chief Judge closed with an admonition that went
unheeded:
"... no election machinery can be upheld if its pur-
pose or effect is to deny the Negro, on account of his
race or color, any effective voice in the government of
his country or the state or community wherein he
lives."' 9
The Democratic Party appealed to the Supreme Court
but certiorari was denied. 20
Still the matter was not finished. There was one loop-
hole remaining. The District Court injunction had ordered
only that Negroes be allowed to vote; it had not specifically
commanded that they be enrolled in the ranks of the party,
though the text of the opinion had made it clear that this
was the intention. The State Democratic Party met in 1948
and limited membership to whites. The right to vote in
.primaries, however, was offered to any person of any race
who would subscribe to a voter's oath, swearing belief in
racial segregation and opposition to a federal FEPC law.2'
The NAACP challenged the validity of this system in
Brown v. Baskin,22 argued once again in Judge Waring's
court. The Judge branded the voter's oath as another piece
1' Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387, 389 (4th Cir., 1.947).
Ibid, 391.
Ibid, 392.
21 Rice v. Elmore, 333 U. S. 875 (1948).
21Rules of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, Adopted by the Demo-
cratic State Convention, Holden at Columbia, May 19, 1948, p. 10.
1 78 F. Supp. 933 (D. C. E. D. S. C., 1948). There were two arguments of
this case. The first was for a temporary injunction; the second for a perma-
nent restraining order, 80 F. Supp. 1017 (D. C. E. D. S. C., 1948).
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of chicanery designed to frustrate the basic principles of
American government. To demand as a prerequisite to
voting that a citizen take an oath subscribing to the beliefs
of a state convention was a flagrant violation of the funda-
mental right of Americans to express their own views and
opinions in selecting their representatives.23
The Elmore case had fully settled the principle that the
Democratic Party in South Carolina was a state agency in
that it performed a public function in holding the only
meaningful election. It was important, Judge Waring em-
phasized, that the defendants realized these facts. They
would be made to carry out the order of the court, not only
in its technical aspects, but in its full meaning and spirit.
Any violation of the letter or the spirit of the injunction
which would issue would be punishable as contempt of
court. "The court is convinced that they are fully aware
of what is the law, and it will not excuse further evasions,
subterfuges or attempts to get around the same."24
On appeal, Chief Judge Parker upheld the Waring de-
cision and remarked: "Courts of equity are neither blind
nor impotent."25
The Democratic Party made no further appeal.
The second point in regard to the private school plan
may now be made. A state may not avoid its constitutional
duties by passing the onus of discrimination on to a private
organization under state regulations, and cleanse itself of
those obligations by expurgating its statute books, and thus,
by closing its legal eyes permit private organizations to
function as they see fit in performing one-time state func-
tions. While Thurgood Marshall's contention that such a
repeal of statutes itself constitutes a denial of equal protec-
tion has never been accepted formally by the federal courts,
nevertheless a position not too far from this has been
reached.2
6
- lbid, 941
Ibid, 942.
-Baskin v. Brown, 174 F. 2d 391, 394 (4th Cir., 1949).
2 For a development of this doctrine in regard to labor unions and racial
discrimination see: Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U. S. 192
(1944) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U. S. 210 (1944) ; Wallace Corp. v.
[VOL. XV
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The most recent white primary case decided by Supreme
Court opinion, Terry v. Adams,27 gives a vivid illustration
of this doctrine. The Supreme Court was presented with a
pre-primary election held by the Jaybird Association of
Fort Bend County, Texas. Participation in the pre-election
was restricted to whites. The Jaybird Association operated
under color of no state law; it was a private group which
nominated candidates only for the primary election. Its
nominees were sometimes defeated, sometimes successful
in the primary. The Court by an 8-1 vote held the barring of
Negroes from voting in this peculiar election to be a viola-
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment.
In his dissenting opinion Justice Minton expressed his
concern over the fact that the Court had discovered some
alchemy which turned successful private action into state
action with the resulting constitutional limitations. He felt
that while there had been justification for holding that
there had been state involvement in the South Carolina
cases, here there was none. He thought that the Court
was seeking to redress wrongs done by private action. It
Labor Board, 323 U. S. 248 (1944) ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen,
338 U. S. 232 (1949) ; Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768 (1952).
In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th
Cir., 1945), cert. den. 326 U. S. 721 (1945), the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that where a municipality had invested a considerable por-
tion of the money and in fact exercised a great degree of control over a
private corporation, the fact that the corporation had been set up by a
private individual did not allow that institution to practice racial discrimi-
nation. The city aid in this case was such as to make the corporation an
agency of the municipality.
There is one recent case which may be used to bolster the private school
plan, i.e., Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451
(D. C. Md., 1948), in which the same federal district judge whom the Court
of Appeals had reversed in the Kerr case held that a private school did not
become a state agency simply because it accepted a substantial sum of
money from the state each year. This case, however, involved an attempt
by a young Negro to be admitted to a hitherto white school, and it should
be remembered in evaluating this as a Judicial precedent that prior to May
17, 1954, "separate but equal" was ruling law. Even conceding that the
school in question had been a state agency there would have existed at
that time no right on the plaintiff's part to be admitted to that particular
institution.
This agency doctrine, or an extension of it, was used by Justice Black in
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946), to rule that a company town per-
mitted to exist by the state could not deny freedom of speech or religion.
See infra, n. 27, for the Jaybird Case In 1953.
For an exposition of this agency doctrine see Thurgood Marshall's brief
in Rice v. Elmore, supra, n. 10.
M345 U. S. 461 (1953).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
was a commendable but nevertheless unconstitutional pro-
cedure.2" Justice Minton's dissent can be construed as a
tacit recognition of the fact that the Court is willing to read
into discrimination cases a sub rosa agency relationship.
The conclusion, then, for the segregation issue is in-
escapable. As long as Justice Reed's declaration, that a
state may not allow a private organization to practice the
discrimination which the state itself cannot, stands along
with Judge Parker's felicitous phrase that courts are
neither blind nor powerless, any system of turning over
public schools to private organizations will run afoul of the
federal courts. If a complete purge of statutes and utter
absence of state financial or police aid did not divest party
officials of their character as de facto state officers, it is un-
likely that the positive action of turning over (even at a
nominal fee) school properties to private corporations will
not taint these corporations as state agencies obliged to
afford equal protection of the law.
Several very practical points suggest themselves in this
context. Could a state divorce itself, in fact, from its police
and health duties which are concomitants of education? For
an organized society such diverse matters as qualifications
of teachers, child vaccination, and special zoning of school
areas demand government regulation. In addition, a great
deal of money will be needed to carry on the school system.
For example, the total needed by the State of Georgia for
public education for the year 1953-54 totaled $137,223,460.29
With this as an annual overhead it would be difficult for
any private corporation to offer education at a cost low
2 Ibid, i8. op. 484, 493: "I do not understand that concerted action of
individuals which is successful somehow becomes state action." This case
is an excellent example of -the individualistic tendencies of the Vinson
Court. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, in which only Justices
Douglas and Burton Joined; Justice Frankfurter concurred alone; and
Justice Clark filed a concurring opinion for himself, and Justices Vinson,
Reed and Jackson. In the Howard case, supra, n. 26, di8. op. 775, 778,
Justice Minton had also dissented:
"I do not understand that private parties such as the carrier and
the Brotherhood may not discriminate on the ground of race. Neither a
state government nor the Federal Government may do so, but I know
of no applicable federal law which says that private parties may not."
C. D. HuTcHiNs AND A. R. MUNSE, PunIo -SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS
OF THE UNiTEo STATES (Washington: GPO, 1955), 85.
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enough for the average citizen to send his children. Some
sort of state subsidy would be necessitated.
There are several delicate twists which could be put on
the basic private school scheme. One county in Virginia has
recently refused to appropriate money for school opera-
tions during the coming year without setting up a plan for
private operation." A federal court undoubtedly could not
order a local government to appropriate the necessary
funds. However the price tag attached to this particular
subterfuge is eventual illiteracy for a large part of the
population.
A second refinement would be for a state to abolish the
public school system and then to give tuition fees directly
to the parents of eligible children to meet the expenses of
private education. Here again there are practical as well
as legal pitfalls. The state could not require that the money
be spent for education, nor could it demand any definite
standards either from the schools or from the citizens with-
out coming into conflict with the A1lwright holding. By
demanding that the money be used in private establish-
ments and by prescribing standards for such corporations,
the state could be held to have made these institutions its
own agents in exactly the same manner as Texas had made
the party primary part of its own electoral machinery.
Even if all the parents cooperated unselfishly and did spend
the money for its true purpose, a court which could not
read indirect state action into such wholesale subsidizing
would indeed be blind."
If the basic plan to turn over public schools to private
corporations is unconstitutional, then it is highly probable
1 Washington Post and Times Herald, June 2, 1954. Georgia has gone
even further and has stipulated in appropriation bills that no funds may
be spent for mixed schools and any official of the state or local government
who does so Is subject to a two year prison term. New York Times, January
20, 1953, 19:1; June 5, 1955, E 9:2-6.
The recent Virginia case of Almond v. Day, 24 L. W. 2221, .. S. E. 2d .. ,
(Va. Sup. Ct. of Ap., Nov. 7, 1955), (see also 24 L. W. 1075), points up the
fact that attempts to install a private school system may involve state as
well as federal constitutional difficulties. However, South Carolina, Georgia
and Louisiana have experienced little trouble in amending their constitu-
tions to fit in with educational plans.
11 Compare language and attitude of the Court in the Child Labor Tax
case, 259 U. S. 20, 38 (1922).
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that any variations in matters of detail to meet practical
problems would likewise be invalid.
Some lawyers have contended that there is one im-
portant distinction between the primary election and the
education cases. The Constitution specifically protects the
citizen's right to vote against discrimination because of
sex or race; but there is no such guarantee of a right to
public education. A state must hold elections of some sort;
it need not educate. Thus while choosing political repre-
sentatives is a public function, education need not be so. 2
This is a contention which could be the basis of serious
litigation, but the answer of the Court would probably run
along these lines: segregation in public education is per se
discrimination; a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
is no less serious an infringement on civil rights than a
violation of the Fifteenth. Then Justice Reed's and Judge
Parker's bons mots could be brought into play for the stare
decisis role. In the segregation decision by the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Warren placed heavy emphasis on the
effects of schooling: "Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.... It is
the very foundation of good citizenship."33 In light of this,
it is improbable that the Court would give weight to an
argument that mass-education, in mid-twentieth century,
can be divested of its public character.
II.
The private school plan has not been the only scheme
proposed to avoid the spirit of the Segregation decisions.
In November of 1954 the voters of the state of Louisiana
approved an amendment to the state constitution which
places the continuation of segregation under the police
power of the state. As an exercise of its inherent authority
to maintain the public health, safety, welfare, and morals,
racial separation is declared valid; for intermingling of the
m This line of reasoning was first suggested to me by Mr. Robert McC.
Figg, Jr., who was the able attorney for the Democratic Party and for the
State of South Carolina in the Segregation cases, supra, n. 1.
'1Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954).
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races in the public school system would mean disorder and
disturbance of the peace."
Although the Fourteenth Amendment was certainly not
designed to interfere with the police power of the state,
yet while a state's police regulations are necessarily special
in their character, and while there is a strong presumption
in favor of the rationality of a state classification, still race
may not be made the basis of such a classification.
In Buchanan v. Warley, 5 in declaring unconstitutional
a city ordinance of Louisville, Kentucky, which forbade
colored persons to occupy houses in city blocks where the
greater number of houses were occupied by white persons
(and vice versa), the Court faced the argument that the
proposed segregation would promote the public peace by
preventing race conflicts but answered: "Desirable as this
is, and important as is the preservation of the public peace,
this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal
Constitution."
Mr. Justice Holmes' dictum in a later case involving the
equal protection clause is apropos:
"States may do a good deal of classifying that it is
difficult to believe rational, but there are limits, and
it is too clear for extended argument that color cannot
be made the basis of a statutory classification affecting
the right set up in this case."36
Mr. Justice Holmes cannot be accused of having been
hostile to the ideal of giving almost a free rein to state legis-
latures in police matters. But an obvious intent of the
m The New York Times, November 4, 1954, 31:1. The text of the amend-
ment is as follows:
"All public elementary and secondary schools in the State of
Louisiana shall be operated separately for white and colored children.
This provision is made in the exercise of the state police power to
promote and protect public health, morals, better education and the
peace and good order in the State, and not because of race. The Legis-
lature shall enact laws to enforce the state police power in this regard."
(Proposed Constitutional Amendments as adopted at the General Election,
November 2, 1954, compiled by Wade 0. Martin, Jr., Secretary of State;
Constitutions of the State of Louisiana (Dart) (1955 Cum. Supp.), Art. 12,
Sec. 1.)
245 U. S. 60, 81 (1917).
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 541 (1927).
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Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with discrimina-
tion because of race,17 and again the Supreme Court has
equated segregation in the public educational process with
discrimination. It is significant that in the May 31, 1955,
order spelling out the manner in which the Court's decision
is to be effected, Chief Justice Warren used the word "dis-
crimination" five times to describe the "separate but equal"
situation. The word "segregation" does not appear in the
text of the order.8
Directly to the point in this matter is the recent state-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the
case of Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
City. 9 In regard to the maintenance of segregation in state
parks this tribunal observed that such racial separation
could no longer be justified as a means to preserve the
public peace. The Supreme Court, it was noted, had shown
that psychological factors as well as physical facilities had
to be considered in ascertaining whether equal protection
of the law was being denied. "With this in mind, it is
obvious that racial segregation in recreational activities can
no longer be sustained as a proper exercise of the police
power of the State; . . ."0 On November 7, 1955, the
Supreme Court affirmed this decision without giving an
opinion of its own."
Away from the constitutional and into the statutory
field, in April of 1955, Governor Hugh White of Mississippi
signed into law a bill which provides a fine and possible
imprisonment for whites who attend a state supported
school with Negroes. The fine is from one to twenty-five
dollars, and the punishment may include up to six months
in jail.42 In a similar move the Georgia State Board of
See Buchanan v. Warley, supra, n. 35.
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955).
220 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir., 1955).
oIbid, 387.
'
1 Mayor City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 100 L. ed. 75 (Adv.
Sh.), 350 U. S. ... (#232, 1955). On the same day the Court, again with-
out writing an opinion of its own, vacated orders by a federal District
Court and Court of Appeals in Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 100 L. ed. 76
(Adv. Sh.), 350 U. S. ... (#396, 1955), permitting segregation on a
municipal golf course and remanded the case to the District Court for a
judgment in accord with the Dawson case, cited above.
42 The New York Times, April 6, 1955, 20:6.
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Education has ordered that all teachers who support, con-
done or agree to the teaching of mixed classes will have
their licenses revoked "forever"."
In view of the National Supremacy Clause (Article VI,
clause 2) it is hard to conceive of the Supreme Court's up-
holding the conviction or administrative punishment of a
person by a state for obeying a federal court order. These
efforts would also fall if justified under the police power,
since the classification both of the offense and the people
affected is clearly opposed to current Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a more subtle vein Georgia and Louisiana have put
forth plans which would allow school superintendents to
assign pupils to schools in advance of the term." Appar-
ently the defense for this course of action would be that
the statutes did not discriminate against anyone, but for
reasons of expediency simply gave to educational directors
the authority to equalize pupil loads and school facilities.
Under such a system segregation would be an accidental
concomitant.
On its face such legislation might seem to be valid. How-
ever, the administration of the law, to be of any assistance
to the states in maintaining segregation, would have to be
discriminatory in the sense that colored children and white
children would have to be, on the whole, assigned to dif-
ferent schools. And as a rather conservative Supreme Court
said in Yick Wo v. Hopkins in regard to a similar issue:
"Though the law itself be fair on its face and impar-
tial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered
by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal dis-
criminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 45
"Time, July 22, 1955, 88
"Louisiana: New York Times, July 7, 1954, 84:7. Georgia: The Georgia
Education Commission, a special group set up by Talmadge, pursuant to
a state law, to study and suggest legislation to maintain segregation, pro-
posed this as one of a series of methods of circumventing the Supreme
Court: New York Times, December 9, 1954, 38:5.
118 U. S. 356, 373-374 (1886).
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North Carolina has enacted a local option law which em-
bellishes without fundamentally changing the Georgia and
Louisiana ideas. Under the North Carolina statute, to city
and county boards have been transferred all authority to
enroll pupils and assign them to various schools. The State
Board of Education is divested of all control over such
matters.4 6 This law could be used to facilitate integration
just as easily as segregation in that it could allow each
county to set its own pace in mixing the races in existing
facilities. The purpose of this bill, however, can be judged
from a resolution which passed both houses of the North
Carolina state legislature without a dissenting vote ten days
later. This resolution said that "mixing of the races in the
public schools in the state cannot be accomplished."4
It is difficult to see how this local option law makes the
legal status of segregation any different from the Georgia
and Louisiana plans. As far as federal courts are concerned,
the official action of a county or municipal agent is the
action of the State. As Justice Jackson remarked in Board
of Education v. Barnette, "The Fourteenth Amendment, as
now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the
State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Education
not excepted."48
Another plan which differs only indirectly from these
last two is that of gerrymandering the school districts so
that Negroes will still attend separate schools. This move
could be based on the hope that the Court would apply its
doctrine of Colegrove v. Green49 to the segregation issue.
In that case the Court refused to "enter the political
thicket" and pass on the constitutionality of Illinois' con-
gressional rotten boroughs. The Vinson Court supported
this decision in South v. Peters,5° where it dismissed a suit
against the county unit system of Georgia which discrimi-
nates both against urban counties, and indirectly against
Negroes, since colored people usually only vote in the cities.
"The New York Times, March 30, 1955, 21:2.
' Ibid, April 9, 1955, 11:3.
'8319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).
"328 U. S. 549 (1946).
W339 U. S. 276 (1950).
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It said in part: "Federal Courts consistently refuse to exer-
cise their equity powers in cases posing political issues aris-
ing from a state's geographical distribution of electoral
strength among its political subdivisions.""
Justices Black and Douglas dissented from both de-
cisions and it may be that with Justices Warren and Harlan
on the bench they could pick up the necessary other three
votes to form a majority and reverse this rule as far as
education is concerned - citing Yick Wo as an authority
in so doing - even assuming that the Court would declare
school districting to be a political question. There would
be good basis for believing that the Court would not con-
sider gerrymandering school districts to be political, or
even if it did, that it would consider the issue of its merits
because of its great importance and the need for settling
the question.52 And it might be observed, that assuming
the possibility of avoiding decision by the Supreme Court,
the practical consequence of gerrymandering are such that
it, alone, could never be fully successful.
In the North, large scale Negro migration has been a
fairly recent phenomenon and colored people have tended
to settle together. The "black belts" of Chicago and Harlem
can easily be districted to exclude educational commingling
of the races. In some instances in the South, particularly
in urban regions, this could be equally as effective; but in
most cases it simply could not be done. Gerrymandering
could cut down integration decidedly, but where the two
races live so closely together complete exclusion would not
be physically possible. This practical difficulty is pointed up
by the cases of Shelly v. Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson
which made racially restrictive covenants unenforceable in
the courts. Thus Negroes have a mobility which would
permit families to move from one district to another if
not at ease, at least at will. City officials would have to
re-district daily to keep ahead of the NAACP.
In all the variations of gerrymandering, there would
always be the possibility that the Supreme Court would
-Ibid, 277.
Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
5334 U. S. 1 (1948) ; ibid.
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take cognizance of the obvious violation of the spirit of its
unanimous edicts in the school segregation decisions, and be
impelled to avoid all technical objections to its jurisdiction
in order to enforce compliance with the spirit of the law. 4
Mississippi has considered another plan. In the fall of
1954, the state House of Representatives passed an act
which according to its title would have prohibited "the
fomenting and agitation of litigation".55 In essence it would
have made it a crime for a plaintiff to have accepted an
inducement from any group to bring a law suit before any
court or administrative agency in Mississippi. Both the
plaintiff and his lawyer could be required to take an oath
that no such inducement had been received or had been
conspired to be received.
Obviously the bill was aimed at the NAACP in general
and Thurgood Marshall and his legal staff in particular.
The act was killed in committee in the state Senate. It is
difficult to see what purpose it could have served if it had
passed. Under its inherent police power a state can protect
itself from nuisance suits and it may be that this particular
bill would have been upheld as such a regulation had it
been applied to persons bringing suit in state courts. But,
certainly the NAACP would institute its cases in the federal
courts and even under the Slaughter House5" decision access
to the federal courts, subject to congressional regulations,
is protected under the privileges and immunities clause.
It is not likely that the federal courts would allow a state
to bar a citizen from use of the federal judicial system to
protect his federal rights.
As a political expedient it has been suggested by num-
erous individuals, and two states have taken concrete steps
to urge,57 that Congress call a national convention to amend
the Constitution to allow state governments to run their
school systems as they see fit. There is certainly nothing
illegal in this. Agitation for change, even though it may be
Supra, circa, n. 52.
Mississippi Legislature, Extraordinary Session, 1954. House Bill #30.
516 Wallace 36 (U. S., 1873) ; see also Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257
U. S. 529 (1922).
17 Mississippi and Georgia: The New York Times, March 11, 1955, 28:6.
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opposed to the views of the majority of the people in the
country, is a fundamental right guaranteed by the First
Amendment. However, in this particular instance it has
no hope whatsoever of succeeding. One can well imagine
the fate of a New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, or Michigan
congressman who voted for such a convention. His defeat
at the next election would be as sure as that of a Georgia
politician who voted for the repeal of the state anti-miscege-
nation laws.
As a palliative rather than a solution, another means has
received serious attention: separation of sexes. Since ad-
mittedly the great objection of the South to intermingling
is biological, this would tend to minimize the dangers in
that respect. It would, probably, be perfectly legal. As a
matter of practice South Carolina, for example, maintained
separate high schools for boys and girls in many areas up
until the last few years. This is not true segregation since
colored boys would attend classes with white boys, and girls
with girls. And again the practical question arises as to
whether it is financially expedient and sociologically wise
to separate the sexes in grammar and high schools. Current
educational doctrine seems to indicate that it is not the best
policy, although it has been used widely enough to show
that it is not a disastrous course of action.
The last set of alternatives open is neither pleasant nor
even covered with a cloak of legality. The possibility of
activity by the Ku Klux Klan, or some similar type organi-
zation, has been suggested, or a combination of economic
pressures, not unmixed with dark hints of stronger action,
might even be employed to discourage Negro parents from
sending their children to "white" schools.
Although Ku Klux Klan activity is patently criminal
under state"8 and frequently federal law, the possibility of
its use again should not be ignored. The white primary
cases provide another excellent parallel in this respect.
Besides the general fact that beatings, floggings, threats of violence, etc.,
are against the law, several Southern states have passed anti-mask statutes.
South Carolina passed such a bill in April of 1951 (The Columbia (1S. C.)
State, April 11, 1951) ; and Georgia had done the same thing earlier that
year (New York Times, January 20, 1951, 19:1).
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After the decisions against exclusion of Negroes from the
ballot in 1947 and 1948, the hooded knights began to ride
in force in South Carolina. The demonstrations ranged in
size from a few night raiders to nine hundred robed Klans-
men and thousands of curious spectators. The peak of the
activity was reached in the years 1950-1951. During this
time there were some forty-three cross burnings and mass
gatherings which drew up to four thousand people. There
were also seven kidnapping-beatings recorded. Thus, the
Ku Klux Klan sprang up while popular reaction against
the white primary decisions was at its height and the Klan
went into eclipse as public interest waned.
The result of this new found life for the masked riders
was, in the final analysis, a victory for civil rights. The
states of North and South Carolina with the full assistance
of the FBI and federal courts began prosecutions in 1951.
Klan activity in 1952-53 .took place mostly in court rooms
packed with the hooded knights on the receiving end of
justice.59
Hodding Carter 60 has warned that this type of reaction
in a more subtle form is being planned already. "Citizens
Councils" are being formed rapidly all over the South.
These organizations have one purpose - maintain segrega-
tion in the public school system. As the Chairman of the
Mississippi Senate Constitution Committee said as he re-
ported the private school amendment out of his committee,
his state would try other means of preventing intermingling
before destroying the school system. Among those means
would be organizations of white people to put "great
economic strain on the Negro"."
As long as it stops short of actual violence such pressure
will be difficult to control. This type of action can succeed
I The author has made what he considers to be a thorough study of the
Klan revival of this period. Among the sources checked were the archives
of two large South Carolina newspapers. Every notice of K.K.K. activity
between the years 1935 and 1953 was examined.
I Hodding Carter, A Wave of Terror Threatens the South, Look, March
22, 1955. The Washington Post and Times-Herald reported (October 20,
1954), that a new surge of Ku Klux Klanism had hit Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Tennessee. In Florida, K.K.K. Titans circulated petitions
for the continuation of segregation (New York Times, September 29,
1954, 29:1).
11 Quoted in The New York Times, September 15, 1954, 17:3.
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only if it has the backing of a large segment of public
opinion; and if it has that backing then effective state prose-
cutions become virtually impossible. But, it is probable
that Congress would be called on to protect federal rights
as declared by the Supreme Court, if they should be
flagrantly abused in any area.
The remnants of the Civil Rights Acts could be con-
strued to make such economic pressure a federal crime:
"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States....
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both."62
However, the difficulties of enforcing this statute are
pointed up by Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court
in the 1951 case of U. S. v. Williams6 3 reversing a conviction
on this count. Justice Frankfurter stated that this par-
ticular section covers only that conduct which interferes
with rights which arise from the substantive powers of the
federal government, the right to vote for example, and does
not protect against interference with those rights guaran-
teed from state violation.
"All the evidence points to the same conclusion:
that §241 applies only to interference with rights which
arise from the relation of the victim and the Federal
Government, and not to interference by State officers
with rights which the Federal Government merely
guarantees from abridgement by the States."64
18 U. S. C. A., Sec. 241 (1950).
-341 U. S. 70 (1951). It should be noted that the Court majority which
reversed this conviction of a Miami, Florida, police officer for using inter
alia a rubber hose, a pistol, a blunt Instrument, a sash cord, and a blinding
light to extract a confession from four Negroes, was obtained only because
Justice Black concurred with Justices Vinson, Frankfurter, Minton, and
Jackson on the basis of res adjudicata. Since his co-defendants had been
acquitted of the substantive charge of depriving a person of his civil rights
and it was not claimed that Williams had cooperated with anyone else,
Justice Black could not see how a conviction for "conspiracy" could he
upheld. Williams could not have conspired with himself. Dis. op. 85, 86.
Ibid, 81, 82.
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III.
In light of the foregoing, replacing public schools with
a private system with or without aid to parents, making it
a criminal offense to attend mixed schools, prohibiting
litigation against the status quo, defending segregation as
an exercise of police power, allowing school supervisors to
separate the races by assigning pupils to schools in advance,
are all believed to be unconstitutional under existing laws.
The calling of a national convention to amend the Consti-
tution is a legal possibility but is practically out of the
question. There is an outside chance that gerrymandering
might perhaps be valid, or be able to avoid Court declara-
tion of invalidity, but its practical consequences make it of
dubious effectiveness. Separation by sexes is both legal and
possible, but here there can be no segregation, only deflect-
ing of the biological fears of the South. Threats of violence
and economic pressure remain against the law - but
against a law that can stand only if supported by an in-
telligent public opinion. Such a recourse may well sap the
strength from the Supreme Court's decision, but this alter-
native would likewise morally debilitate a great people. The
price of success would be the destruction of law and order.
The main trends which the "generation of litigation"
will take have been analyzed. Cases have been cited which
provide adequate precedents to void continued educational
segregation. Lawyers who restrict themselves to legal tech-
nicalities may find precedents and obiter dicta to sustain
arguments in favor of the various plans for evasion. How-
ever, any such defense overlooks the vital spirit and per-
sonal make-up of the Supreme Court. A bench that cut
through the veil of "private organizations" to bury the
white primary, that forbade labor unions to discriminate
against Negroes if such unions utilized federal legal ma-
chinery, that held racially restrictive covenants unenforce-
able, that refused to countenance segregation in public
schools - such a group of Judges will hardly provide a
ready audience for hair-splitting arguments in favor of
de facto state discriminatory action accomplished either
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by public or by private agents. Indeed the decisions of
the 1955 October term display a definite intention of the
part of the Court to extend rather than to restrict its
ban on segregation."8
The conclusion must be that as long as the present Court
is fundamentally unchanged in its membership and views,
attempts to evade the historic decision of May 17, 1954,8
will be foredoomed. The Court, or at least its immediate
predecessor, has not been noted for its defense of civil
liberties in general. Yet one of its most acute critics has
admitted that:
"All in all, the liberal record of the Vinson Court in
racial discrimination cases stands out in sharp contrast
to the generally anti-libertarian trends of its decisions
in other fields. Moreover, a comparison of the 1948 and
1953 restrictive-covenant decisions, as well as the 1944
Steele and 1952 Howard decisions, reveals a progres-
sively developing boldness in the handling of discrimi-
nation issues. 6 7
The replacement of Justices Vinson and Jackson by Justices
Warren and Harlan would seem to have done nothing to
move the Court away from its position on racial matters.
The tenor of its implementing decision of May, 1955," is one
of firm adherence to its desegregation policies. Although
leaving some leeway in time and method to those states
where the problem is greatest, the Court seems to have
assumed that there will be a good faith attempt to comply
with the law as it has now been clearly declared.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 100 L. ed. 75 (Adv.
Sb.), 350 U. S. ... (#232, 1955) ; Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 100 L. ed. 76
(Adv. Sb.), 350 U. S. ... (#396, 1955). It should be noted that on May 24,
1954, one week after the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U. S. 974 (1954),
and thereby refused to review a Court of Appeals ruling, 193 F. 2d 384
(5th Cir., 1951), that segregation on a municipal golf course was permissible
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Supra, n. 1.
*7 C. HERMAN PRITCHEIT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT (Chicago:
University of Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 145.
0Supra, n. 1.
